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SECTION 482 AND SUBPART F:
AN INTERNAL REVENUE CODE DILEMMA
David Myers'
INTRODUCTION
The globalization of business increases cross-border transactions involving United States domestic and multinational corporations.' From a
United States tax standpoint, transactions which enable United States

taxpayers to manipulate their business affairs in a manner which inaccurately reflects their true income in a given year raise a multitude of

issues 2 Two issues continually resurface in the tax codes and courts:
issues relating to transfer pricing between related parties 3 and issues
relating to income of United States shareholders who control foreign
corporations.4
The transfer pricing rules and the Internal Revenue Code ("Code")

encompass both separate and interlaced spheres of influence over domestic and multinational corporations. 5 Through adjustments involving
* J.D. Candidate, May 1998, Washington College of Law, The American
University;, M.B.A. 1990, Pepperdine University, School of Business and Management;
B.S. 1988, University of Maryland. I would like to thank Professor Richard Gordon
and Buigid Conybeare for their guidance and inspiration. Special thanks to the entire
IiJ staff for their editorial assistance.
1. Internal Revenue Service, Industry Specialization Program Coordinated Issue,
Construction/Real Estate Industry, Use of IRC 482 andlor Subpart F for Services to
CFC's, 1992 WL 526256 (1992) (revised April 17, 1995) [hereinafter Use of IRC 482
and/or Subpart F].
2. Cym H. Lowell, International Corporate Transaction Planning and Section
482, 37 PRAc. L. INsT. 637, 638 (1995) [hereinafter Corporate Transaction Planning]
(discussing that multinational company transactions inevitably raise cross border technical issues involving transfer pricing of commonly controlled entities).
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (1986) (describing the main tool that the Internal Revenue Service uses to allocate transfer pricing issues).
4. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.951-964 (1986) (omitting § 963 (repealed in 1975)) (describing the section of the Internal Revenue Code regulating United States shareholders
and controlled foreign corporations).
5.
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transfer pricing and controlled foreign corporations, the United States
potentially loses
a vast amount of income, mainly due to lost tax reve6
nue income.

In 1954, Congress enacted § 482 as a tool to allocate income among
taxpayers,7 and has subsequently amended it twice. 8 § 482 allocates income among related parties by referencing "how unrelated parties dealing at arm's length would have handled the transactions." 9
This important Code provision allows the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") to retroactively police the reporting of United States and multi-

national companies' tax filings in the United States, which reflect fair
allocations of income to related entities.'" This allocation effectively
reduces the ability of such companies to underreport income in the
United States and to overreport income of subsidiaries incorporated in
low tax jurisdictions, thereby lowering their overall tax assessment."
Similarly, Subpart F of the Code, encompassing §§ 951-964, contains
provisions which tax a United States shareholder' 2 of controlled foreign

1400-01 (7th ed. 1992). Transfer pricing rules, for the purposes of the United States
corporation, are rules which allocate a price for goods bought and sold between separate entities under common control of a parent company. One commonly refers to
these transfers as "intracompany transfers." Id. The measurement of performance and
profitability between individual business units of a corporation remains the principal
reason for the use of transfer pricing. Id. See Corporate Transaction Planning, supra
note 2, at 638 (noting the substantive provisions of the Code pick up where the accounting rules end in determining how United States tax laws regard allocation of
income).
6. Francis M. Allegra, Section 482: Mapping the Contours of the Abuse of Discretion Standard of Judicial Review, 13 VA. TAX REV. 423, 432 (1994) [hereinafter
Abuse of Discretion Standard] (noting as of the end of 1992, of the cases pending in
the tax court, the six largest cases involved tax deficiencies of over $9.4 billion).
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (1954) (as amended in 1986).
8. Id. (as amended Oct. 4, 1976 and Oct. 22, 1986).
9. See Corporate Transaction Planning, supra note 2, at 638 (discussing that the
substantive issues regarding transfer pricing exist to determine how entities, some of
which corporations located in low tax rate countries, allocate income and loss among
themselves).
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (1986). See Corporate Transaction Planning, supra note
2, at 638-39 (stating that the Secretary (through the IRS) can redistribute income
among entities if necessary to prevent tax evasion).
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (1986). See Corporate Transaction Planning, supra note
2, at 638-39 (discussing concerns Congress has regarding offshore based companies
not paying their fair share of United States taxes).
12. See Treas. Reg. § 1.952 (1986) (defining subpart F of the Code which holds
that the IRS considers any United States person who owns, either directly or indirectly, at least 10 percent of the voting rights of a foreign corporation's stock to control
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corporations 3 as if the corporation distributes income to that shareholder as an annual dividend.' 4 Congress intended the provisions of Subpart
F to accurately reflect income earned by a United States shareholder in
the year the taxpayer actually earned the income, rather than alloving
that income to remain tax-free (from a United States standpoint) until
repatriated into the United States.'
This Comment argues that in certain instances, the Code allows United States taxpayers to incur international double taxation on income
earned during a given year and that § 482 and Subpart F of the Code
remain overly subjective to the point of providing an unclear standard
for United States taxpayers. Therefore, Congress should amend the Code
to include objective standards, to correct the anomalies discussed below,
and to employ the concept of national tax harmonization as a goal to
bring together international principles of nondiscrimination, neutrality,
and reciprocity.
Part I of this Comment briefly discusses the historical developments
and the current rule regarding § 482. Part II examines the historical developments and the current rule regarding Subpart F. Part ii addresses
two major issues raised by the existence of the two rules: the possibility
of double taxation and the subjectivity in interpreting the rules. Finally,
Part IV presents recommendations for change to the current rules in
order to more accurately reflect the true nature of intracompany transactions.

a foreign corporation). See also Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinationals, 79 CORNELL L REV. 18, 75-76 (1993) [hereinafter Source-Based Taxation] (discussing the applicability of Subpart F income to
United States shareholders under the existing Code).
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.951 (1986). The Code also defines a foreign company as a
"controlled foreign corporation" if United States shareholders as a group own, either
directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the voting rights of the corporation or
the corporation's stock. Id. See Source-based Taxation, supra note 12, at 78 (describing what constitutes controlling a foreign corporation).
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.951 (1986). See Source-based Taxation, supra note 12, at 7678 (describing the threshold whereby a foreign corporation becomes a controlled foreign corporation). See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.951-1.964 (1986) (defining Subpart
F).
15. Eric T. Laity, Anatomy of Sections 951(AJ(I)B) and 956 of the Internal
Revenue Code, 14 VA. TAX REV. 71, 76 (1994).
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I. § 482 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Since the Revenue Act of 1921,16 tax law has contained provisions
similar to § 482. Congress enacted these sourcing provisions in 1921 to
counter the "illogical" conclusion of certain administrative interpretations
which effectively allocated income of an "essentially United States corporation" to a jurisdiction with lower effective tax rates. 7 Since then,
extensive legislative regulations have reshaped this section to place controlled taxpayers on a tax parity with uncontrolled taxpayers, decided
according to the arm's length standard.' The regulations have articulated the arm's length principle since 1935 as a gauge for testing taxpayer

transactions.'

9

Commencing with the 1921 Revenue Act, the Tax Commissioner has
had the power to reallocate income and expenses among related parties.20 Beginning in the early 1960's, the Treasury Department and Congress became concerned with the significant rise in the formation and
use by United States multinationals of foreign subsidiaries located in
lower tax jurisdictions." In the years prior to the 1968 Amendment to
the Code, Congress evaluated several amendments to § 482.22 § 482, at

16. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 85, § 240, 42 Stat. 227 (1921) (current version at
26 U.S.C. § 482 (1986)).
17. See Corporate Transaction Planning, supra note 2, at 640-42 (describing the
general sourcing provisions of the Code). The sourcing rules distribute income to the
jurisdiction earning it. The Code has incorporated this rule into two distinct sections,
861 (United States source) and 862 (foreign source) to treat income depending on
category of income. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.861 and 1.862 (1986).
18. See John W. Lee & Mark S. Bader, Contingent Income Items and Cost Basis
Corporate Acquisitions: Correlative Adjustments and Clearer Reflection of Income, 12
J. CORP. L. 137, 166 (1987) (discussing the legislative revisions including the arm's
length standard); Corporate Transaction Planning, supra note 2, at 641-42 (discussing
the legislative history behind § 482 and the arm's length provision).
19. See Corporate Transaction Planning, supra note 2, at 638-42 (discussing the
use of the arm's length standard through the revisions of § 482).
20. See ELIZABETH KING, TRANSFER PRICING AND VALUATION IN CORPORATE
TAXATION: FEDERAL LEGISLATION vs. ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 2.1.1 (1994) [hereinafter TRANSFER PRICING AND VALUATION] (noting that the Commissioner had the
right to reallocate income and expenses between related entities since the 1920's).
21. Id. at 11-12.
22. See id. at 12 n.6 (indicating that between 1943 and 1968, Congress entertained several amendments which would increase the power of the IRS to enforce §
482). Ultimately, Congress concluded that § 482 provided the IRS with sufficient
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that time, primarily focused on intracompany transactions dealing mainly
with tangible property, loans and services, and to a much lesser degree,
intangible property.6 The 1968 Provisions dictated three possible methods for determining the arm's length price for tangible property. 4
The 1968 Provisions also provided for intangible pricing via the comparable uncontrolled transaction method. Due to the high degree of
uncertainty in applying the comparable uncontrolled method, however,
the Regulations also included a list of twelve factors' for consideration
in establishing a comparable price.' These twelve factors have since
proven problemati 2 Additionally, the 1968 regulations articulated
cost-sharing provisions, service provisions, and loan provisions." Congress deemed the cost-sharing provisions to sanction cost-sharing agreements among related parties, whereas the service and loan provisions
power to prevent United States multinational's tax evasion activities. Id.
23. See Barbara N. McLennan, Responses to Section 482 Litigation: Advance
Pricing Agreements or Arbitration?, 54 TAX NOTES 431 (1992) (discussing the evolution of section 482 through case law and the legislative process); TRANSFER PRICING
AND VALUATION, supra note 20, at 13 (discussing the Treasury Department's focus
prior to and including the 1968 Regulations).
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (1968) (amended in 1986). The three methods were the
comparable uncontrolled price method, the resale price method, and the cost-plus method. Id. §§(a)(1) and (b)(1)-(d)(1). See TRANSFER PRICING AND VALUATION, supra
note 20, at 13 (listing the three methods to determine arm's length prices for tangible
property).
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.482(b)(2)(ii)(B)(l)-(12)(1968)(amended in 1986). The twelve
factors include: prevailing royalty rates in the same industry for similar property;, offers by competing transferors and bids by competing transferees; terms of the transfer
uniqueness of the property and the period during which the property is likely to remain unique; degree and duration of protection of the property in the relevant countries; value of services rendered by the transferor to the transferee; prospective profits
realized, or costs saved, through the use or subsequent transfer of the property; capital
investment and start-up expenses required of the transferee; availability of substitutes;
arm's length rates and prices paid by unrelated parties; costs incurred by the transferor in developing the property; and any other facts or circumstances likely considered
by the unrelated parties. Id
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (1968) (amended 1986). Due to the uniqueness of intangible property, a comparable uncontrolled transaction is difficult to determine and
therefore poses difficulties in application both for the IRS and the multinational firm.
27. TRANSFER PRICING AND VALUATION, supra note 20. at 18 (noting that the
application of more than one factor often returned two different transaction prices).
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a)-(d) (1968) (amended 1986).
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provided a "safe harbor"29 in determining arm's length rates.30 Congress, to date, has not revised the service and loan provisions.3 '

The 1968 regulations proved difficult to effectuate, mainly due to
inapplicability of the comparable uncontrolled pricing method32 and

litigation involving intangible transfers.33 The ongoing reformulation of
transfer pricing regulations truly began with a major amendment, the
1986 Amendment. 34 The recognized difficulties in administering and
enforcing § 4823' and the courts problematic guidance of the regulations served as the impetus for this amendment. 36 The 1986 Tax Reform Act expanded the provisions to encompass transfer or licensing of

29. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in
the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 130 (1995) (suggesting that certain pricing arrangements between related parties may fall within a
"safe harbor" in terms of § 482 allocations). A "safe harbor" means, for the purposes
of this comment, that the IRS deems the price allocated among related parties an
arm's length price, which, therefore satisfies § 482's requirement.
30. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-2(a)-(d) (1986).
31. TRANSFER PRICING AND VALUATION, supra note 20, at 19-20.
32. See id. at 21 (explaining that the IRS found the 1968 Regulations to apply
when the comparable uncontrolled pricing method used inexact comparables).
33. The courts took the position that one should use only the information
available at the time of the transfer to determine the arm's length price paid to the
transferor. See Eli Lily v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 996, 1131-33 (1985) (finding
respondent's reallocations of gross income, which reallocated the income attributable
to an intangible product to petitioner under § 482, warranted and respondent's adjustments unreasonable); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 252, 341 (1987)
(upholding as reasonable, the respondent's application of § 482, which allocated income to the petitioner attributable to the use of income-producing intangibles). But
see Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226, 230 (1991) (holding that the
Commissioner abused his discretion under § 482 when he determined that SunPac
acted as a subcontractor of petitioner, even though the royalty contained in the license
agreement did not constitute an arm's length consideration for the use of petitioner's
intangibles, and was therefore unreasonable); Westreco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64
T.C.M. (CCH) 849 (1992) (determining that the fees paid to petitioner by Nestec for
research and development services clearly reflected income under § 482, and therefore
fell within an arm's length range); R. T. French Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 836,
837 (1973) (holding that a corporation made royalty payments to an affiliated foreign
company pursuant to licensing arrangements at arm's length, and therefore the
Commissioners improperly denied the deductions).
34. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, § 936(h)(3)(B) (codified as
amended in § 26 U.S.C.). See TRANSFER PRICING AND VALUATION, supra note 20, at
11 (discussing the 1986 Amendment in relation to the other Code amendments).
35. TRANSFER PRICING AND VALUATION, supra note 20, at 24.
36. Id. (proffering IRS reasons for amending § 482 after the 1968 Amendment).
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intangible property within the scope of § 482.3' Along with the 1986
Act, the Conference Committee Report 8 introduced the idea of "periodic adjustments" for intracompany charges paid for transferred intangibles? 9 The reactions to the Conference Committee Report were the
1988 White Paper, the 1992 Proposed Regulations, 4' and the 1993
Temporary Regulations.42 On July 8, 1994, the IRS released the final
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (1986). The 1986 Amendment amended the provision to
include: "f[in case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property (within the
meaning of § 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer or license shall
be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible." Id. This amendment
had the effect of combining tangible with intangible property to further close the gap
on under-reporting or evasion of taxes by United States taxpayers.
38. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Title D1, at 293-374 (1986)
(trying to correctly allocate tax and tax deferrals on intangibles); HR. REP. No. 426,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., Title VI, at 329-406 (1986) (directing the Treasury Department
and the IRS to study and report the current situation regarding intracompany pricing
rules).
39. See TRANSFER PRICING AND VALUATION, supra note 20, at 24-25 (claiming
that taxpayers were to use the periodic adjustments to adjust the intraeompany charges
if earnings attributable to the intangible changed significantly after inception). No enactment of this clause occurred in the 1986 statutory changes. Id. at 25.
40. A Study of Intercompany Pricing (The White Paper), Notice 88-123, 1988-2
C.B. 458. See TRANSFER PRICING AND VALUATION, supra note 20, at 26 (attempting
to define the 1986 Amendments "commensurate with income" language, redefining the
concept of comparability relating to intangible property, proposing alternative intangible pricing methods, and modifying the 1968 Regulations cost-sharing provisions to
further specify the scope of the cost-sharing among related parties).
41. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482, 57 Fed. Reg. 3571 (1992) [hereinafter The 1992
Proposed Regulations]. See TRANSFER PRICING AND VALUATION, supra note 20, at 3233 (stating that several years following the White Paper, concerns grew regarding
abuses of the transfer pricing system). The 1992 Proposed Regulations diverged from
the White Paper's direction. Ld.Specifically, it elaborated on and redefined the arm's
length principle to extend the IRS's power in determining related party intracompany
prices, it concerned itself more with foreign based multinationals with United States
subsidiaries than with U.S. multinationals with foreign based subsidiaries, and it modified the 1968 Regulations tangible property provisions by eliminating priorities of the
evaluation methods to determine arm's length prices. Id. The 1992 Proposed Regulations specifically dealt with arm's length intangible property, defining three methodologies applicable to intangibles. Id.
42. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-T (1993) [hereinafter The 1993 Temporary Regulations]. See TRANSFER PRICING AND VALUATION, supra note 20, at 40-42 (discussing
that due to negative reactions, both in the United States and abroad, to the methodol-
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amended transfer pricing regulations which are similar to the 1993 Temporary Regulations. 3

A significant line of cases has upheld § 482 allocations. ' Since the
1940's, case law involving § 482 interprets this Code as intending to
prevent the avoidance or lessening of taxes paid by controlled taxpayers.
In addition, the section intends to reflect income clearly as the controlled taxpayer earns it, whether intentionally or merely made improperly in bookkeeping.4'
B. RULE AND APPLICATION
The courts define § 482, relating to the allocation of income by commonly controlled companies or indirectly by the same interests, as broad
ogies regarding intangibles, the 1993 Temporary Regulations attempted to return to a
more common ground by combining aspects of the 1968 Amendment, the 1986
Amendment, the White Paper, and the 1992 Proposed Regulations). The end result of
the 1993 Regulations weakened, but did not eliminate, the 1992 Proposed Regulations
ann's length range test, formally eliminated a ranking of methods contained in the
1968 Amendment, and clarified or elaborated on issues arising during the years since
the 1968 Amendment. Id.
43. T.D. 8552, 59 Fed. Reg. 34971 (July 8, 1994). See D. Kevin Dolan & David
Bower, Final Transfer Pricing Regulations, 361 PRAC. L. INST. 511 (1994) (describing
the final transfer pricing regulations as essentially similar to the 1993 Temporary Regulations, and discussing its emphasis on the best method rule).
44. See supra note 33 (naming the significant cases upholding § 482 allocations).
See also National Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600, 602-03 (3d Cir. 1943)
(upholding the allocation as within the IRS discretion); Northwestern Nat. Bank of
Minn. v. United States, 556 F.2d 889, 891-92 (8th Cir. 1977) (rejecting a taxpayer's
assertion that the taxpayer cannot properly apply § 482 to transactions which might
not otherwise occur between unrelated parties).
45. See Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 586, 597 (E.D.
Tenn. 1963) (stating that I.R.C. § 482 grants the Commissioner broad and general
powers to allocate or redistribute income if necessary to prevent tax evasion or to reflect income clearly); Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 508,
510 (6th Cir. 1940) (allocating income between a Tennessee corporation and a Mississippi corporation, in a manner to reflect the true source of gross income of the respective companies). See also Ross v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir.
1942) (indicating the Commissioner's authority to impose Code regulations to prevent
tax evasion, even if improperly done in bookkeeping between parties); Advance Mach.
Exch. v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 1006, 1008-09 (2d Cir. 1952) (cautioning that although the Commissioner has broad power to allocate income to avoid tax evasion,
he cannot disregard valid tax entities in determining the party to be allocated income); United States v. Berger, 325 F. Supp. 1297, 1302 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (discussing
the Commissioner's power to prevent tax evasion or the arbitrary shifting of income
or deductions among controlling and controlled companies).

1996]

INTERNATIONAL TAXATION

1081

in scope with sufficient breadth to cover Treasury regulations enacted
thereunder.' As currently written in the Code, § 482 empowers the
Secretary and his delegates' to distribute or allocate income between
organizations if they determine that such an allocation is necessary to
"[P]revent the evasion of taxes" or "[C]learly reflect the income of
the... businesses."' 4 Congress designed this section of the Code to
hinder "[A]rtificial shifting, milking, or distorting" of income and to

46. See Kerry Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 108, 109 (9th Cir. 1974)
(defining § 482 as broad in its scope with sufficient breadth to cover taxpayer attacks
on the Treasury Regulations).
47. See Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 586, 597 (indicating that the provisions of I.R.C. § 482 authorize the Secretary of the Treasury or his
delegates to reallocate expenses in order to avoid tax evasion or clearly reflect income). Treasury regulations allow the Secretary to delegate such authority to district directors and district directors may redelegate such authority to a revenue agents. Id.
Additionally, courts have read into the statute to authorize the Commissioner of the
IRS to determine the true taxable income of members of controlled groups of taxpayers in cases where taxable income of a controlled group operating using the arm's
length standard and those not using the standard differ. Fitzgerald Motor Co., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 508 F.2d 1096, 1102 (5th Cir. 1975). The Commissioner's powers of
discretion, in IRC § 482 cases, are duly broad and far-reaching, limited only when a
situation arises whereby a necessity dictates the Commissioner's action. See also Peck
v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1985) (confirming the Commissioner's
broad powers); National Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir.
1943) (discussing the authority vested in the Commissioner by Congress). But see
Abatti v. Commissioner, 644 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1981) (indicating that when §
482 would surprise the taxpayer at trial, the court will not allow the Commissioner to
invoke it).
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (1986). - Allocation of income and deductions among
taxpayers.
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions credits,
or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income or any of
such organizations, trades, or businesses. In the case of any transfer (or license)
of intangible property (within the meaning of § 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with
respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.
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correct the reporting among entities under common managerial control;49 the end result placing such multinational corporations on a "tax
parity" with corporations within the same tax jurisdiction." This provi-

sion requires that the Secretary make a determination as to the necessity
of the reallocation, before invoking this section of the Code' In practice, Congress designed this section of the Code as a tool against multinational corporations underreporting taxes in the United States which
results in tax avoidance.52
Invoking § 482 involves two essential elements. First, the Secretary
determines or indicates that the same interest owns or controls two or
more trades, businesses, or organizations. Second, he determines whether
allocation among these types of organizations becomes necessary to
prevent evasion or misrepresentation of income.53 After the Secretary
deems the two elements exist, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Commissioner of the IRS, or their delegates use variations of the arm's
length standard to determine whether and how to allocate a transfer
pricing issue among commonly controlled interests to properly reflect
true income.5 4 The Treasury regulations prescribe six methods for de49. See Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 405 U.S. 394, 400-01
(1972) (citing B. BrrrKER AND L EuSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 15-21 (3d ed. 1971)) (indicating that the purpose of § 482

is to compare a controlled taxpayer on the same tax parity as an uncontrolled taxpayer).
50. See Young & Rubican, Inc. v. United States, 410 F.2d 1233, 1244 (Ct. CI.
1969) (indicating that I.R.C. § 482 prevents arbitrary shifting of income among commonly controlled companies and can position such companies on a "tax parity" with
uncontrolled companies).
51. See Interstate Fire Ins. Co, 215 F. Supp. at 597-98 (discussing that the invocation of § 482 is at the discretion of the Commissioner, and that legislative history and the Treasury Regulations support this assertion).
52. See Young & Rubican, Inc., 410 F.2d at 1244 (illustrating that in practice,
the courts authorize the Commissioner to reallocate income so as to prevent tax evasion in cases where taxpayers shift profits among controlled corporations).
53. See B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d. 1144, 1152-53 (2d Cir. 1972)
(stating that the term "controlled" includes "[a]ny kind of control, direct or indirect,
whether legally enforceable, and however exercisable or exercised"). The court continues to discuss the "reality" of the control, which is not dependent on its form or the
"[mlode of its exercise" and presumes it if taxpayers have arbitrarily shifted income
or deductions. Id. The two elements must exist to justify sustaining an I.R.C. § 482
application. Id. See also Local Finance Corp. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 629, 632
(7th Cir. 1969) (discussing that the two essential elements of a § 482 inquiry include
the existence of commonly controlled companies, and barring the Commissioner's reallocation, income which one of the companies would not otherwise report).
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(a). See United States Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 617
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termining the arm's length price and their respective standards of application.5' The six methods, in preferential order of use include: the
comparable uncontrolled price method5 the resale price method, the

F.2d 942, 947 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing that parties should use the "arm's length
standard" in determining § 482 allocations); Northwestern Nat. Bank of Minneapolis
v. United States, 556 F.2d 889, 891 (8th Cir. 1977) (dictating that the ann's length
standard use the "uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer" as the standard). See generally William R. Leighton & T. Richard
Sealy IlL Federal Income Tax Issues in the Organization, Financing, and Operation
of Maquiladoras, 23 ST. MARY'S L. REv. 721, 735-37 (1992) [hereinafter Operation
of Maquiladoras] (exemplifying the arm's length standard as it applies to Mexican
Maquiladoras).
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(a)(1)-(6). See Operation of Maquiladoras, supra note
54, at 735-37 n.49 (describing the application of three of the six arm's length pricing
methods as they could apply to Maquiladoras).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(b). "The comparable uncontrolled price method evaluates whether the amount charged in a controlled transaction is arm's length by reference to the amount charged in a comparable uncontrolled transaction." Id. The similarity of products generally will have the greatest effect on the comparability under
this method. ld. Attention must be given, however, to minor differences in quality of
the product, contractual terms, level of the market, geographic market in which the
transaction takes place, foreign currency risks, alternatives available to the parties to
the transaction, or other general economic conditions that could materially alter the
price in an uncontrolled transaction. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(b)(2)(ii)(B)(1)-(8).
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(c).
The resale method evaluates whether the amount charged in a controlled
transaction is arm's length by reference to the gross profit margin realized in comparable uncontrolled transactions. The resale price method
measures the value of functions performed, and is ordinarily used in
cases involving the purchase and resale of tangible property in which the
reseller has not added substantial value to the tangible goods by physically altering the goods before resale. For this purpose, packaging, repackaging, labeling, or minor assembly do not ordinarily constitute physical alteration. ld.
One makes such determination by subtracting the appropriate gross profit from
the applicable resale price. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(c)(2)(1).
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cost-plus method, s the comparable profits method,59 the profit split
method, 60 and other unspecified methods. 6'
I1. SUBPART F
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The income taxation of domestic, foreign and multinational corporations has, as an essential substantive element, the source of the income.62 Congress, concerned with segregating United States source in-

58. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d).
The cost plus method evaluates whether the amount charged in a controlled transaction is arm's length by reference to the gross profit markup
realized in a comparable uncontrolled transaction. The cost plus method
is ordinarily used in cases involving manufacture, assembly, or other
production of goods that are sold to related parties. Id.
The cost plus method measures an arm's length price by "adding the appropriate gross profit to the controlled taxpayer's cost of producing the property involved in
the controlled transaction." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d)(2)(1).
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(a).
The comparable profits method evaluates whether the amount charged in
a controlled transaction is arm's length based on objective measures of
profitability derived from uncontrolled taxpayers that engage in similar
business activities under similar circumstances. Id.
Under the comparable profits method, the determination of an arm's length result is
based on the amount of operating profit that the tested party would have earned on
related party transactions if its profit level indicator were equal to that of an uncontrolled comparable operating profit. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(b)(1).
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(a).
The profit split method evaluates whether the allocation of the combined
operating profit or loss attributable to one or more controlled transactions
is arm's length by reference to the relative value of each controlled
taxpayer's contribution to that combined operating profit or loss. Id.
Such relative value of each controlled taxpayer's contribution to the success of the
relevant business activity must be determined in "a manner that reflects the functions
performed, risks assumed, and resources employed." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(b).
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(e). "An unspecified method should take into account
that uncontrolled taxpayers evaluate the terms of the transaction by considering the
realistic alternatives to that transaction, and only enter into that transaction if there
are no other preferable transactions."
62. See JON E. BISCHEL & ROBERT FEINSCHREIBER, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION

9-11 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter

FUNDAMENTALS OF

TAX] (describ-

ing the United States taxing provisions and concluding that the source of income is
jurisdictional to classes of income). See also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.861-64 (1986) (categorizing income on a source basis).
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come from foreign source income in order to properly allocate United
States-based income, enacted sourcing of income provisions in 1921.
During that era, foreign source income of foreign corporations controlled
by United States shareholders were not subject to United States tax. 4

As a result, no taxation of United States shareholders occurred until the
corporation repatriated the foreign profits into the United States. Thus

theoretically, the shareholder could defer payment of taxes on profits
indefinitely." Forty years later, President Kennedy revived concern
over the deferral of taxes in his 1961 presidential message.6

Congress again became concerned that companies used controlled
foreign corporations to extract United States-source income to lower

taxed domiciles, and as a result, enacted the controlled foreign corporation ("CFC") provisions in Subpart F of the Code in the Revenue Act

of 1962.' The 1961 proposed Subpart F rules suggested taxing United
States shareholders "as if the controlled foreign corporation had distribIn 1962,
uted a pro-rata portion of all of its earnings each year."'

Congress enacted Subpart F rules, but narrowed their scope to eliminate
only transient income that corporations moved to tax haven countries.0

Congress, however, possessed no intention to classify the tax deferrals
not accomplished through tax haven vehicles as Subpart F income.:'

63. See Corporate Transaction Planning, supra note 2, at 648 (discussing that

Congress enacted the source of income provisions as a "tax base defense mechanism.").
64. See id (discussing the pre-1962 Revenue Act environment in which Congress
did not tax multinationals on foreign-source income until it became repatriated).
65. See id (alluding to the inevitable conclusion that taxpayers may defer non-repatriated income indefinitely).
66. Special Message to the Congress on Taxation, PUB. PAPERS 290, (Apr. 20,

1961).
67. See Corporate Transaction Planning, supra note 2, at 648 (echoing the con-

cern of Congress regarding the resurfacing of foreign corporate activities designed to
"siphon" income away from United States tax authorities).
68. Special Message to the Congress on Taxation, PUB. PAPERS 294-96, (Apr. 20,
1961). See Source-Based Taxation, supra note 12, at 76 (discussing the original intent of Congress regarding the operations of the Subpart F provisions).
69. See Source-Based Taxation, supra note 12, at 76 (discussing the narrowing of

Subpart F provisions from the provisions originally proposed).
70. See Corporate Transaction Planning, supra note 2, at 649 (providing reason-

ing why Congress did not intend for non-tax haven transactions to fall within Subpart
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Congress expressly averred that its intended purpose remained not to
disallow tax deferrals in general, but only to disallow those deferrals of

income earned through "artificial transactions, income without valueadded, and without economic activity" of the CFC in the country of

incorporation (the lower tax jurisdiction).7' Congress reiterated its sentiment in many statutory amendments to Subpart F.'
Congress enacted Subpart F provisions to counter controlled foreign
corporations' potential abuse of United States tax laws.73 It enacted
these provisions as a tax-base defense mechanism to accurately report
the income of activities transacted within the United States.74 For ex-

ample, a multinational company can maximize its income by charging a
subsidiary (to which it shifted income) artificially low transfer prices
and inaccurately reflect true income of the two entities.' Subsequently,
Congress has made only cosmetic amendments to Subpart F of the
Code.76

B. RULEs AND APPLICATION
Some taxpayers increased their use of CFC's to minimize or to avoid
taxes.' These taxpayers developed schemes in order to disguise or to
otherwise conceal evidence of this evasive activity.7" Subpart F of the

F scrutiny).
71. Id.
72. This sentiment is referred to in the TAx REFORM ACr OF 1969, S. RE'. No.
552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 289-91 (1969); THE TAx REFORM ACT OF 1976, S. REP.
No. 841, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 224-25 (1976); THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, H.
REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 608 (1986).
73. See Corporate Transaction Planning, supra note 2, at 641 (describing the
reasoning behind enactment of the Subpart F provisions).
74. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1921). See Intel Corp. v.
Commissioner, 100 T.C. 616, 624-27 (1993) (describing the underlying concerns
voiced in legislative debates after the Revenue Act of 1918).
75. See Source-Based Taxation, supra note 12, at 76 (illustrating the application
of the Subpart F provisions).
76. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.955-1, 1.963-1 (1968) (as amended in 1976) (striking
out § 955 and replacing it with an identical item 955 and also striking out § 963,
entitled Receipt of minimum distributions by domestic corporations).
77. Use of IRC 482 andlor Subpart F, supra note 1, at 1-2 (noting the methods
used to minimize or avoid paying taxes).
78. See id. (indicating that the schemes could involve: 1) providing services to a
CFC at something less than an arm's length transaction; 2) providing tangibles or
intangibles to a CFC at something less than an arm's length transaction would be at
arm's length; 3) elective shifting of income or deductions between the controlling and
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Internal Revenue Code, entitled Controlled Foreign Corporations, encompasses §§ 951-964,"' and dictates that if a "United States sharehol-

der"'

owns more than 10 percent of the total combined voting power

of all classes of voting stock of a CFC,8' he must report his pro rata

share of the CFC's undistributed income as earned income in each taxable year.' The CFC taxes the income attributable to the United States

shareholder in the year the taxpayer earned the income.a When the
CFC finally distributes the income as a dividend to that United States
m '
shareholder, it levies no additional tax

Additionally, the CFC grants

a foreign tax credit to the United States shareholder for any taxes paid
in a foreign tax jurisdiction, on income applicable to the same income
reported in the United States.85

the controlled companies, and; 4) providing financial assistance to the CFC at something less than an arm's length transaction).
79. 26 U.S.C. §§ 951-964. Subpart F of the Code is found within Title 26, Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter N, Part DI.
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.951-4(b) (1986). A "United States shareholder" for purposes
of Subpart F, means, with respect to any foreign corporation, a United States person
(as defined in § 957(c)) who owns (within the meaning of § 958(a)). or who the
Code considers as owning, by applying the rules of ownership of § 958(b), ten percent or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to
vote of such foreign corporation. Ld.
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(a) (1986). For purposes of Subpart F, the term "controlled foreign corporation" means any foreign corporation if more than fifty percent
ofi (1) the total combined voting power of all classes of stock of such corporation
entitled to vote, or (2) the total value of the stock of such corporation. is owned
(within the meaning of § 958(a)), or is "considered as owned by applying the rules
of ownership" of § 958(b), by United States shareholders on any day during the
taxable year of such foreign corporation. Id.
82. See PAUL R. MCDANIEL & HUGH J. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED
STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 118-20 (2d rev. ed. 1981) (discussing the legislative history of the taxation of income of foreign corporations with United States shareholders as they apply to legitimate deferrals of income and deferrals which manipulate United States tax rules).
83. 1i at 119 (discussing the treatment of the United States shareholder). See
supra note 80 (discussing the meaning of a United States shareholder).
84. AU.T, supra note 82, at 118-20.
85. See id. (addressing the application of § 951 in general and § 951(a)(2) in
particular). See infra note 86.
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The substantive Subpart F sections of the Code applicable to this
comment include §§ 951,86 952,7 954,8 and 95789. Aside from financial services, the Code directs Subpart F provisions at two principle
types of income, passive investment income and related party income.' °
As enacted, Congress designed this Subpart of the Code to discourage
United States taxpayers from deferring United States taxes owed. To do
so, it used foreign-based corporations located in low tax jurisdictions. 9

86. Treas. Reg. § 1.951(a) (1986). § 951 provides, generally, that if a foreign
corporation qualifies as a CFC for a period of thirty days or more during any taxable
year, every United States shareholder of the corporation who owns stock in the corporation on the 1st day of such year shall include in gross income, for that taxable
year in which or which such taxable year of the corporation ends, a pro rata share of
the CFC's Subpart F income. Id.
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.952(a) (1986). § 952 defines Subpart F income with regard
to CFC's as the sum of:
1) insurance income (defined in Treas. Reg. § 1-953), 2) foreign base
company income (defined in Treas. Reg. § 1-954), 3) an amount equal
to the product of. A) the income of such corporation other than income
which is attributable to earnings and profits of the foreign corporation
included in the gross income of a United States person under § 951
multiplied by the international boycott factor (determined under Treas.
Reg. § 1-999), 4) the sum of the amounts of any illegal bribes, kickbacks, or other payments paid by or on behalf of the corporation during
the taxable year of the corporation directly or indirectly to an official,
employee, or agent in fact of a government, and 5) the income of such
corporation derived from any foreign country during any period during
which § 9010) applies to such foreign country.
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.954(a) (1986). § 954 defines foreign base company (FBC)
income as income for any taxable year the sum of:
1) the foreign personal holding company income for the taxable year, 2)
the FBC sales income for the taxable year, 3) the FBC services income
for the taxable year, 4) the FBC shipping income for the taxable year,
and 5) the FBC oil related income for the taxable year. Id.
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.957(a) (1986). § 957 defines a "controlled foreign corporation" (CFC) as any foreign corporation if more than fifty percent of:
1) the total combined voting power of all classes of stock of such corporation entitled to vote, or 2) the total value of the stock of such corporation, is owned, or is considered as owned by applying the rules of
ownership (as defined by Treas. Reg. § 1-958(b)), by U.S. shareholders
on any day during the taxable year of such foreign corporation. Id.
90. See RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN A NUTSHELL
§9.02 (West ed., 1989) (stating that multinationals use a base company in a low tax
jurisdiction rather subject themselves to taxation in a higher tax jurisdiction on the
same income).
91. See id. § 9.01 (giving an overview of controlled foreign corporations and
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Because Subpart F attacks two types of highly moveable income, one
must scrutinize each situation to determine whether Subpart F applies. 2
One must also keep in mind that § 960 provides foreign tax credit to
United States shareholders for income taxed under Subpart F.3
I. ISSUES AND CONFLICTS WITH THE RULES
A. RELATIONSHIP BEIEEN § 482 AND SUBPART F
The provisions in § 482 and Subpart F include two of the many provisions in the Code which attempt to deter United States taxpayers from
deferring or avoiding taxation on foreign earnings.' Congress drafted
these types of provisions to overlap in scope in order to force taxpayers

to recognize income when they earn it.95
Throughout the years, Congress focused on whether taxpayers' derived
earned income came from the added value activities or from non-economic activities in defining foreign based sales and service income.3
Subpart F focuses essentially on the same inquiries as

§ 482.' Congress codified § 482 in some form since the 1920's. How-

related provisions of the Code).
92. See id. § 9.03(a) (discussing the types of highly moveable income applicable
to Subpart F inquiries).
93. See id.§ 9.05 (noting that § 960 of Subpart F allows a foreign tax credit
for income taxed in foreign tax jurisdictions, in order to minimize double taxation on
the same income).
94. See id. § 9.06 (discussing that Congress has attempted, through at least six
different tax regimes, to prevent the deferral or avoidance of United States taxation of
foreign earnings). The five applicable provisions, aside from the Subpart F provisions,
are: "accumulated earnings tax provisions, personal holding company tax provisions,
foreign personal holding company provisions, foreign investment company provisions,
and personal foreign investment company provisions." Id.
95. See DOERNBERG, supra note 90, § 9.06 (stating that Congress drafted § 482
and Subpart F to overlap and to share as a common goal the forced recognition of
income when earned).
96. 2 JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN
TAXPAYERS AND FOREIGN INcohiE 25.6.1 (1990) (hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TAXATION].
97. See Corporate Transaction Planning, supra note 2, at 660-62 (discussing the
parallel focus of § 482 and Subpart F). But see INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, supra
note 96, T 25.3.1 (discussing that § 482 applies gingerly to transactions between for-
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ever, when Congress began developing Subpart F provisions in the early
1960's, very few regulations and cases existed which addressed intemational transfer pricing issues." The initial legislation proposed in the

House,'

encompassing Subpart F provisions, included a proposal to

change the language of § 482."°° The House Ways and Means Committee Report' perceived that § 482 was not an effective device to
prevent taxpayers from "siphoning off' income from the United States
to lower tax jurisdictions.'" Although the Committee did not directly
address the relationship between § 482 and Subpart F, it did indicate
that the two provisions of the Code addressed the same tax base erosion
concern. 3 Unfortunately, the Senate bill °" did not contain the
House's proposed amendments to § 482 because the Senate believed that
§ 482 already contained stringent language to address and deter improper allocations of income among United States multinationals and their
foreign based subsidiaries.0"
The interrelationship between the two sections may act as a tax
disincentive, be partially responsible for the decline in the United States
trade balance since 1968, and allow the Tax Court or the Commissioner
to apply subjective criterion to the allocation of 482 transfer prices or
Subpart F distributions." °6 Additionally, one can see the interrela-

eign related parties and therefore Subpart F provisions more readily apply to determinations of economic worth).
98. See INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, supra note 96, 25.3 (describing countermeasures by the Treasury Department prior to enactment of Subpart F provisions). See
also Corporate Transaction Planning, supra note 2, at 660 (discussing the difference
between the long legislative history of § 482 and the relatively short history of Sub-

part F).
99. H. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1962).
100. See Corporate Transaction Planning, supra note 2, at 661 (explaining the
difficulties in determining a fair price under § 482). The House proposed amendments
to § 482 which would allocate income proportionally to assets or expenses of the
United States and foreign companies, unless the arm's length allocation produced a
"fair market price." Id.
101. H. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 462 (1962).
102. Id. See Corporate Transaction Planning, supra note 2, at 661 (stating that no
other explicit correlation seems to exist besides the 1961 Report).
103. H. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 462 (1962).
104. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 78-84 (1962).
105. Corporate Transaction Planning, supra note 2, at 661.
106. See generally Julia A. Coyne, United States Taxation of Exports, 14 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'- L.. 547, 551-53 (1991) [hereinafter United States Taxation] (noting that
because the United States insists on taxing United States entities on their foreign
source income, it has put these entities at a competitive disadvantage and possibly
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tionship between the two sections in the application of § 482 and Subpart F to Foreign Base Company Sales Income,'" Foreign Base Company Services Income,"ns and the investment in United States property." An example indicates the ease with which multinationals can arrange their affairs in such a way as to avoid triggering § 482 and Subpart F allocations.Yo

subjected them to double taxation of their income). The article also proffers the idea
that the IRS agents apply subjective criteria in their application of the arm's length
standard, citing that only three percent of the 403 cases studied actually applied a
"true" arm's length price. ML
107. See Final Transfer Pricing Regulations, supra note 43, at 555-59 (illustrating
that § 954(d) and § 482 co-apply to instances where the IRS interprets controlled foreign corporations as solely used to capture income without any economic activity allocated to the domestic taxpayer).
108. See 11 at 559-63 (indicating that the relationship between § 482 and § 954(e) is reasonably clear because the IRS uses § 482 as a measuring stick for allocating arm's length costs for services provided and then applies the substantial assistance
tests to the controlled foreign corporation if it deems them foreign base companies).
109. See id. (indicating that § 956 and transfer pricing issues become related if
the taxpayer uses a deferral of earnings not subject to Subpart F application in the
United States). Under this scenario, if the corporation had paid a dividend, the IRS
would then use § 482 to determine the appropriate rate of interest applicable to the
deferred earnings. Id.
110. If a company ("Co. A"), for example, owns forty percent of the non-voting
stock of a subsidiary ("Co. B"), domiciled in a low-tax jurisdiction, transactions between the two organizations may fall under the umbrella of I.R.C. § 482 and Subpart
F. When Co. B sells Co. A widgets at Co. A.'s retail price, I.R.C. § 482 and
Subpart F can come into play.
Under I.R.C. § 482, the Commissioner would look to see if the transaction
between Co. A and Co. B took place at arm's length. If it had, no lR.C. § 482
reallocation of income would ensue. If the transaction were anything but arm's length
however, an I.R.C. § 482 reallocation of income would result, since it would allow
Co. A (in a higher tax jurisdiction) to report income on the difference between cost
(from Co. B, which would equal Co. A's retail price) and income from retail sales.
Taking into account overhead of Co. A, Co. A would most likely report a loss in the
United States. On the other side of the equation, Co. B would report its income as
the difference between its cost and the revenue from sales to Co. A. The profit reported by Co. B would most likely be greater than if it had sold its widgets to a
third party. But, remember that Co. B is in a low tax jurisdiction and the income tax
levied on Co. B would be much lower than if it had domiciled itself in the United
States. Combining loss in the United States by Co. A and forty percent of the income reported by Co. B taxed at current United States tax rates, the total reportable
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In practice today, the provisions of § 482 apply the arm's length stan-

dard to United States parents and their foreign based subsidiaries."'
The income allocated to the foreign subsidiary will then fall under
Subpart F interpretation to determine whether the IRS should allocate

income attributed to the United States parent currently or qualify it for a
deferral."' The interrelationship between § 482 and Subpart F focuses
on whether the earnings of the multinational derive from operations that
"add appreciable value," rather than non-economic activities, which only
13
exist to avoid or evade taxation."

B. PossIBILrrY OF DOUBLE TAXATION
International tax disputes develop when more than one country claims
tax jurisdiction over the same item of earned income.' Such disputes

may result from inconsistent definitions of source income or from uncertainty regarding the residence of the taxpayer. The most substantial
sources of the disputes, however, derive from allocation and transfer

income for Co. A. in a given year turns out substantially lower than had it reported
income transacting with an uncontrolled third party.
Under Subpart F, the IRS would not include Co. A as a United States shareholder and would not include Co. B as a controlled foreign corporation since Co. A
does not own more than ten percent of the voting stock of Co. B, and Co. A, directly or indirectly, does not own more than fifty percent of the voting stock of the
corporation. Since Subpart F does not apply to Co. A and Co. B, the respective companies would only report income in their respective domiciles as necessary under current law. The foregoing example illustrates the ease at which companies, like Co. A
and Co. B do not fall within the confines of IRC § 482 or Subpart F.
111. See generally Procter & Gamble v. Commissioner, 961 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir.
1992) (applying the arm's length standard to Procter & Gamble's Swiss wholly-owned
subsidiary); Central De Gas De Chihuahua, S.A. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 515, 517
(1994) (applying the arm's length standard against two related Mexican parties).
112. See United States Taxation, supra note 106, at 549-53 (discussing how
Subpart F relates to § 482). See also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C.
348, 361 (1990) (holding that § 482 and Subpart F deem tax deferral and tax haven
implications unacceptable). This holding demonstrates that the Tax Court has accepted
the interplay of the two sections.
113. See Corporate Transaction Planning, supra note 2, at 660 (suggesting a parallel relationship between Subpart F and § 482 to inquiries regarding international
operating activities of multinationals).
114. C. David Swenson, Competent Authority Relief from Double Taxation Caused
by Intercompany Pricing Adjustments, 314 PRAc. L. INST. 475, 479 (1991). See
Johansson v. United States, 336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964) (illustrating possible double
taxation involving a resident of Switzerland performing services in the United States).
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pricing issues." 5 Regardless, international tax disputes involving double taxation pose various problems for taxpayers.

International double taxation typically arises when the same entity
becomes liable in two different tax jurisdictions for taxes on the same
item of earnings." 6 Typically, the host country taxes the earnings gen-

erated within its boundaries, based upon a territorial connection with the
source of the income." 7 The foreign domicile then taxes income per-

sonally connected with the recipient, taxing them on their world-wide income."'9 The concurrence of these two events constitutes double taxation."
Under international conventional wisdom, the residence country will
usually yield tax jurisdiction to the source country, either through do-

mestic tax law or treaty,"z in order to prevent double taxation.'

115. See Paul D. Tutun, Arbitration Procedures in the United States-Gennan Income Tax Treaty: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in International Tax Disputes,
12 B.U. INT'L LJ. 179, 183-84 (1994) (introducing the competent authority process
with regard to international tax disputes).
116. Id. at 184-85. The author illustrates that:
[tiransfer pricing issues arise when a tax authority of Country X determines that
corporation A, within Country X's taxing jurisdiction, has been shifting A's
profits to A's [foreign-based subsidiary], corporation B, which is located in
another tax jurisdiction. If Country X determines that corporations A and B
have been making transactions not at arm's length, or at an unfair advantage to
Country X, Country X will then subject A to a price adjustment based on
arm's length principles and thereby increasing A's taxable income. However,
A's foreign-based subsidiary, in Country Y, will still be subject to Country Y's
existing level of tax under Country Y's tax laws. Unless Country Y accepts
Country X's upward price adjustment on Country A and implements a corresponding downward adjustment to B's income, the income of A and B wvil
be . . . subject to double taxation. Id.
117. See Yves Bonnard, The "Triangular Case" in the New U.S. Netherlands Tax
Treaty: Mechanisms and Tax Planning, 23 DENv. J. INT'L L & PoLY 161, 163-64
(1994) [hereinafter Triangle Case] (discussing the basis whereby double taxation occurs internationally).
118. Id.
119. See supra note 114 (discussing the possibilities of double taxation).
120. See generally Model Double Taxation Convention of Income and on Capital,
Report of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Arts. 6-21 (1977) (determining the
respective rights to tax of the State of Source and of Residence); ADELAIDE PAssOs,
TAX TREATY LAW 67 (Juta & Co., Ltd. eds., 1986) (discussing reciprocal rights and
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The residence domicile usually employs one of two mechanisms, an exemption system'2 or a tax credit system,"

in applying the residence

principle. Alternatively, a country implementing the source principle
need only determine whether a taxpaying entity earns its income from

operations derived within that country's tax jurisdiction.

4

If so, that

country taxes the income. While the above-described scenario provides
an effective means for avoiding double taxation, without any tax treaty

or internal law provision, a United States multinational and/or its foreign
subsidiary could incur tax liability in a multitude of tax jurisdictions." z
Another complicating factor that occurs, depending on one's view, is
the clarity or obscurity of the interplay and distinction between the two

obligations that treaty participants have towards tax jurisdictions and protocol). See
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Aug. 31, 1994, U.S.-Fr., S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-32 (1994).
121. Hugh J. Ault & David R. Tillinghast, Federal Income Tax Project, International Aspects of United States Income Taxation II, Proposals on United States Income Tax Treaties, A.L.I. 5-6 (1992). See Eric J. Smith, The U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty,
8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 97, 98 (1993) (discussing that the avoidance of double taxation remains the most serious tax barrier to income tax treaties).
122. See Triangle Case, supra note 117, at 162 (claiming that the exemption system, or the "territorial system," exempts residents from foreign source income and
illustrating that the Netherlands uses the exemption method as a relief from double
taxation). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.911 (1986) (allowing United States citizens living
abroad to exclude a portion of foreign earned income applicable to United States
taxation).
123. See Triangle Case, supra note 117, at 164 (stating that the tax credit system
grants residents a "tax credit" to counter foreign taxes imposed on income earned in
a foreign domicile). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.901-908 (1986) (describing the United
States foreign tax credit).
124. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Alternatives for International Corporate Tax Reform, 49 TAx L. REv. 599, 600 [hereinafter Corporate Tax Reform] (discussing the
source principle as it pertains to income derived from within jurisdictional borders).
125. See generally T. Modibo Ocran, Double Taxation Treaties and Transnational
Investment: A Comparative Study. 2 TRANSNAT'L L. 131, 131-38 (1989) (illustrating
that a United States multinational or its subsidiary can possibly incur tax liability).
This liability can be incurred in: 1) the United States, where the IRS taxes income
earned through operations worldwide; 2) the domicile of the foreign subsidiary, where
the multinational derives income from manufacture or other operations pertinent to the
United States multinationals; and 3) another tax jurisdiction which may tax either the
Unites States parent or its subsidiary for transacting business within its jurisdiction.
Id.; Smith, supra note 121, at 99-100 (illustrating circumstances which may bring
about double taxation of foreign based earnings).
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principles.'2 The international standard requires deference to the
source country when taxing corporate income and to the residence country when taxing investor income."v One view states that the principal

justification for corporate income tax is a withholding tax on the individual shareholder." To justify this theory, scholars state that the
costs imposed on the public sector entitle countries to tax in order to

get reimbursed.'
The prevailing theory of income taxation, however, allocates the costs
of government among taxpayers. 3

Source-based taxation differs from

this prevailing theory.' Essentially, the taxpayer's tax burden is not
dependent on his worldwide income and the source country does not
base the tax rate on the taxpayer's total income." In effect, this view
violates the progressitivity principle of the prevailing theory on income
taxation.'33

126. See Source-Based Taxation, supra note 12, at 27-28 (exemplifying that when
the United States imposes a tax on the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation, it
considers the subsidiary a domestic resident). It will apply the § 482 arm's length
standard to allocate income between the entities so that total income is properly reported. Id. As such, the United States appears to use the arm's length standard to
implement a residence rather than a source based taxation. Id. See also Use of IRC
482 andlor Subpart F, supra note 1 (illustrating the choices in allocation to be either
§ 482 or § 954(e) allocation for services provided).
127. Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the
International Tax Base: Principles and Practices, 47 TAX L. REV. 565, 567-68 (1992)
[hereinafter Corporate Integration] (reviewing the contention that working groups under the direction of the League of Nations developed the foundations which became
effective in the 1920's).
128. See Source-Based Taxation, supra note 12, at 28 (explaining the position of
withholding tax on the individual shareholder).
129. See RIcHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN
THEORY AND PRActicE, 373-74 (5th ed. 1989) (promoting the benefits theory of taxation). The public sector includes the cost of public goods and services used, and "external" costs, such as the cost of pollution and intangibles. Id.
130. See Source-Based Taxation, supra note 12, at 29.
131. See Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 124, at 603-04 (discussing that sourcebased taxation and the conventional approach to taxation are no longer based on the
same premise).
132. Source-Based Taxation, supra note 12, at 29.
133. Id.
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Additionally, most of the industrialized countries no longer base their
domestic income tax systems on the premise that they should tax corpo13 4
rate and shareholder income based on separate theories of taxation.
The separation of the two categories of taxable entities produces several
undesirable consequences, including disincentive for investment and incentive for corporate earning retention.' 35
Integration of corporate and shareholder taxation would lessen some
of the undesirable consequences, including the possibility of double
taxation. One, however, must note that concerns over double taxation
occur not only between a United States parent company and its foreign
subsidiary, but also between a United States multinational, its foreign
subsidiary, and its shareholders. 3 6 Shareholders, whom the IRS taxes
based upon a residence rather than a source theory, may ultimately
derive less net income because of this disintegration.
The standard approach to dividing income among jurisdictions possibly is misguided. This misguidance arises primarily because parties may
structure international transactions derived through multinational corporations specifically to gain advantages not available through arm's length
pricing. 137 By employing the cost-sharing methodology presently enacted, firms can determine the scope of their shared research projects. 38
As such, they can define the scope of the cost-sharing agreements narrowly, and "require foreign subsidiaries operating in lower tax jurisdictions to participate only in successful ventures," thereby effectively allo39
cating costs and risks to the United States entity.

134. See Corporate Integration, supra note 127, at 582-93 (claiming that parties
have often termed separation taxation of the corporate and shareholder "classical corporate taxation"). Over the last thirty years, however, most industrialized countries
(other than the United States) have integrated their corporate and individual tax
schemes as a matter of domestic law. Id.
135. See Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 124, at 604 (illustrating the
disincentives of the conventional approach to taxation).
136. See generally Standing Under Commercial Treaties: Foreign Holding Companies and the Unitary Tax, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1894 (1984) (discussing the background
of the unitary tax controversy which may lead to double taxation of multinationals,
foreign companies, and shareholders).
137. See Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 124, at 605-06 (discussing the operational problems encountered through the current international division of income).
138. TRANSFER PRICING AND VALUATION, supra note 20, at 30.
139. Id.
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C. SUBJECTIVENESS
The language of the Code lends itself to various interpretations by the
courts and administrators." The Treasury Department and the IRS
must continually explain the sections of the Code itself.1 4 Nevertheless, Congress and the courts have constantly averred that the IRS has
broad authority to allocate taxable income under § 482, and the courts
should not reverse those allocations unless "arbitrary, capricious, or
resulting from an abuse of discretion.' 42 Whether or not the IRS possesses the authority to reallocate income under its discretion, the IRS
should have the responsibility to provide an objective standard (to the
taxpayer) for the application of income relating to transfer pricing and
controlled foreign corporations.
Early in the legislative process of the 1968 Act, Secretary of the
Treasury Dillon, in his 1961 testimony before the House, voiced serious
concerns about whether "difficulties in determining a fair price under
this provision (§ 482)" would limit Congress' power to reallocate income between controlled and controlling parties. 43 Legislative amendments, including the use of the twelve factors in determining a comparable uncontrolled transaction price, still yield different estimated arm's
length prices depending on the factor used." Thus, neither the Legislature nor the Treasury appear to have proffered a clear standard to aid
in pricing international transactions.
Prior to 1987, the Tax Court applied various tests to § 482 and
Subpart F cases, taking into account the appropriateness of deductions

140. Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REv. 841 (1992).
141. Id. The Treasury Department and the IRS frequently issue regulation and

revenue rulings to delineate their position on a Code provision. Id. This is evidenced
by the "reasonable cause and good faith" exception of § 6662(e)(3)(d), which Congress based on a general subjective standard. Treas. Reg. 1-6662(e)(3)(d) (1993). The
1993 IRS ruling explains this exception as "allowed only if the requirements for excluding adjustments from the threshold are met." The Accuracy-Related Penalty Under
Prior Law and After RRA '93, 4 J. INT'L TAX'N 568, 569 (1993).
142. Abuse of Discretion Standard, supra note 6, at 434.
143. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1962).
144. See generally TRANSFER PRICING AND VALUATION, supra note 20, at 21-24
(describing the difficulty in administering the arm's length standard by illustrating that
the twelve factors often lead to discrepancies in transaction price).
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and credits averred in association with taxpayer filings. 4 s The court

applied an objective test in some cases in determining whether the business transaction was "a sham" and lacked economic substance." Separate from this objective test, the court also used a subjective business

purpose test in numerous other transfer pricing cases. 47 In those cases,
the court determined whether the taxpayer had engaged in the subject
transaction with an "actual and honest profit objective."'" In general,
the Tax Court failed to apply a precise standard to subjective or objec50
tive profit motive cases. 49 In Rose v. Commissioner,1
the court
combined subjective and objective tests in an attempt to identify and
qualify an objective standard.' 5' Ultimately, the court has failed to provide an encompassing standard,
and instead merely shifted the onus to
52
other sections of the Code.
Two current holdings of the courts confirm the subjectivity by which
the IRS allocates taxpayers' income. 5 3 As evidenced in Bausch and
145. See Kathleen 0. Lier, The Evolution In Tax Shelter Litigation: The Tax Court
Closes The Door On Generic Tax Shelters, But A Window Remains Open With Respect To The Additions To Tax And The Increased Interest Under IRC S.6621(C), 36
Loy. L. REv. 275, 275-279 (1990) [hereinafter Generic Tax Shelters] (discussing tax
shelter cases and the effect of the Rose decision on the application of the Code).
146. Id. at 279 (noting that the objective test prior to Rose incorporated a subjective test to ascertain whether the suspect transaction derived from a valid business
reason). If the court objectively thought a valid business reason existed for the transaction, the court would not deem the transaction inappropriate. Rose v. Commissioner,
88 T.C. 386, 410 (1987). See Packard v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 397, 417-18 (1985)
(defining the first prong of the sham inquiry as a subjective test simply concerned
with the taxpayer's motives); Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184,
203, 209 (1983) (holding that unless the taxpayer structures the transaction solely for
tax avoidance considerations, the court cannot treat the transaction as a "sham");
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978) (holding that to treat
a transaction as a sham, the transaction must have no economic substance, no possibility for profit, or the taxpayer's motivation stems from the prospect of obtaining tax
benefits by entering the transaction).
147. Rose, 88 T.C. at 411-12.
148. Id. See Generic Tax Shelters, supra note 145, at 280 (discussing that under
separate sections of the Code, including I.R.C. § 183(a)-(c) (1988), the Tax Court relied on numerous subjective factors in determining whether a taxpayer's transaction
harbors an illegal or unethical motive).
149. Generic Tax Shelters, supra note 145, at 281.
150. 88 T.C. 386 (1987).
151. See Rose, 88 T.C. at 409-15 (constructing the four-prong objective test).
152. See Generic Tax Shelters, supra note 145, at 285-92 (stating that since the
adoption of the Rose four-prong test, the court opened other avenues for tax shelter
abuse and shifted the tax litigation "battleground" to other sections of the Code).
153. See generally Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 525 (1989)
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Lomb, Inc. v. Commissioner,' the IRS erroneously reallocated income
between the parent company and a foreign subsidiary because it failed
to properly determine the transfer price of intangible, as well as tangible, property prior to the allocation.'" Alternatively, in United States
v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,'" the Court held in favor of the
IRS, and thus solidified the IRS' interpretation of the foreign tax credit
as it applies to CFC's.'s The IRS' successful defense of its position
in one case and its unsuccessful defense of its allocation in another,
especially in light of the apparent clarity of the transfer pricing and controlled foreign corporation statutes, illustrates the subjective nature of the
application of the regulations.
15
Other Tax Court cases, such as Ezxon Corp. v. Commissioner, s
represent a firm rejection of the IRS's attempt to minimize the effect of
foreign law on the taxation of "United States income," as dictated in the
Supreme Court's decision in First Security Bank of Utah v. United
States. 59 These cases identify several instances in which the Court re-

(dictating that under § 482, the IRS must establish a transfer price for both intangible
royalty payments and tangible property); United States v. Goodyear Tim and Rubber
Co., 493 U.S. 132 (1989) (ruling that United States law, not foreign tax principles,
governs for purposes of applying a foreign tax credit).
154. 92 T.C. 525 (1989).
155. Id. at 598.
156. 493 U.S. 132 (1989).
157. Id. at 143-44.
158. Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 721 (1994). See Procter & Gamble
v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 323 (1990) (illustrating that the IRS misallocated royalty
income to a Spanish subsidiary under § 482 instead of another CFC of a United
States multinational, and thus generated Subpart F income to Procter's Swiss subsidiary under 954(c)). The Tax Court rejected the IRS's allocation, partly relying on
First Security Bank, and holding that §§ 482 and' 954 do not apply when the law
bars a taxpayer from receiving royalty income and only applies when [complete] control over a subsidiary to shift income exists. Id.
159. 405 U.S. 394 (1972). The IRS attempted to reallocate insurance commissions
from an insurance subsidiary to the parent bank to reflect the true division of profits
based on merit. Id. at 394-400. The United States Supreme Court rejected the IRS's
reallocation argument, holding that- 1) because of legal restrictions they were barred
from receiving commissions, and 2) "control." for the purposes of 482 (and Subpart
F) could not exist unless the controlling party had exclusive power to shift income
among its subsidiaries. Id. at 400-07. See Marc M. Levey and James P. Clancy, 482
Allocation Barred in "Aramco Advantage" Cases, 5 J.INT'L TAX 203 (1994) [here-
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jected the IRS' arguments that attempted to reallocate income based on
literal readings of the Code.' 6

Neither the IRS' actions nor the obscurity of the Code can remain the
sole basis for the subjective character of the IRS' actions. Sometimes,

the problem lies in the access to information or with management at the
IRS.' Many times, as is the case with the application of § 482 or
§ 954 to intangibles, the taxpayer becomes the only source of the infor-

mation needed for the IRS to properly allocate income among related
taxpaying parties." When the taxpayer refuses to comply with IRS
requests for information or cannot explain how it established the intracompany pricing, the IRS is unable to adequately price a transaction. 63The resulting allocation sometimes is interpreted as misappropriation in
the guise of subjectiveness.'" Another source of IRS misappropriation
of taxpayer income occurs because management at the IRS emphasizes
the importance of closing tax cases on a timely basis and not disturbing
"established taxpayer relationships."' 65 Either way, the end result to
the taxpayer is uncertainty in application of sections of the Code.
The 1992 Proposed Regulations and the 1993 Temporary Regulations
also do not provide any specific guidance in pricing transfers of tangible
and intangible property when the transfer involves a combination of

inafter Aramco Advantage Cases] (discussing how Saudi Arabia's price restrictions
barred the IRS from redistributing profits under I.R.C. § 482 - the "Aramco advantage").
160. See generally Aramco Advantage Cases, supra note 159, at 203-210 (illustrating cases which show the rejection of the IRS's allocations under §§ 482 and
954).
161. See Marc M. Levey, et al., Transfer Pricing of Intangibles After the Section
482 White Paper, 71 J. TAx'N 38, 47-48 (1989) [hereinafter Transfer Pricing of Intangibles] (discussing the White Paper's speculations on the difficulties of obtaining
taxpayer information regarding the suspect transfer pricing transactions). See generally
Treas. Reg. §§ 7602 and 982 (providing power under the Code to access information
for purposes of determining whether taxpayer intracompany allocations were proper).
162. Transfer Pricing of Intangibles, supra note 161, at 47-48 (discussing the
White Paper's speculations that management at the IRS provides for untimely closure
of tax cases).
163. See id. (claiming the possibility of the IRS's inability to properly price intracompany transaction without the assistance of the taxpayer).
164. See Eli Lily & Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990, 997 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (disregarding the Commissioner's subjective considerations in allocating income and concentrating on the ultimate result of the allocation).
165. See Transfer Pricing of Intangibles, supra note 161, at 47-48 (discussing the
emphasis at the IRS to close cases on a timely basis and reluctance to harm existing
taxpayer relationships).
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tangible and intangible property."6 Because many transfers involve
such a combination,"6 the Regulations contain an apparent deficiency
which also leads to a subjective allocation of an arm's length price.
As a result, and if history is any guide, the courts All reverse the

Commissioner's allocations in future and pending cases. 3 The reasons
for the reversals have included, and will continue to include, application

of an overly strict standard of review, application of the incorrect standard of judicial review, and the substitution of the Tax Court's judgment

for the Commissioner's. 69

MY.RECOMMENDATIONS
A. NATIONAL TAx HARMONIZATION

Double taxation issues, in relation to tax reform, usually encompass
three distinct principles: nondiscrimination, 7 ' neutrality,"" and reei-

166. INTERCOMPANY PRICING: GUIDE TO THE NEW 1993 UNrrED STATES RuLES,
THE BAKER & MCKENZmE NORTH AMERICAN TAX PRACICE GROUP 50 (1993).
167. Id.
168. Abuse of Discretion Standard, supra note 6, at 433.
169. Id. at 434.
170. See Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 124, at 601 (noting that nondiscrimination via tax treaties usually involves an agreement for one country not to
discriminate against another, including, but not limited to, taxing foreigners in a manner that does not discriminate against them).
171. See Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 124, at 601-02 (defining neutrality by.
considering three different views). One view is that an international tax system should
be capital export neutral. Id. This leads to the assumption that, all things being equal
(in a tax context), one will allocate capital to its highest and best use. Id. Secondly,
the international tax system should become capital import neutral. Id. This view assumes that a country should tax all income earned in that country at the same rate
regardless of who earned it. ld. A final view states the international tax system
should become nationally efficient Id. This view assumes that a particular country
should concern itself with allocating its own economic welfare to its own needs and
thus countries should tax domestic companies equally whether abroad or at home. Ld.
See also Yoseph Edrey & Samuel Shani, The U.S. Taxation of Aliens, 21 CAP. U. L
REV. 121, 124-26 (1992) (describing the unique dimension of tax neutrality principles).
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procity. 7 2 All three principles, however, have as a common thread the

goal of creating a level playing field for taxpayers." 7
Additionally, problems arise with the international tax system in general, including: incorrect premises, 74 tax differentials,' 75 and operational differences. 76 In the end, those who make recommendations to reduce the existence of double taxation encounter difficulty in coming to a

consensus about how to rectify the tax law differences among nations.'"
Several people have made recommendations throughout the years as to
how Congress should revise the tax laws in order to eliminate double
172. See Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 124, at 602 (defining reciprocity via
treaty as generally involving the equal reduction of taxes paid in a residence country
as the taxpayer paid in a source country or vice versa).
173. Id. at 601-03 (noting that the three principles illustrate the goal of tax parity
by recognizing foreign persons as legitimate taxpayers on par with domestic taxpayers,
the concept that capital flows to the least tax base, and that the tax paid in one
country can defer taxes paid in another).
174. Id. at 603-07 (categorizing three separate problems which arise in double
taxation situations). The review continues discussing a fundamental problem of the
premise of separate taxation faced by tax reformers. Id. at 604. Separate taxation of
shareholders and corporations discourages investment by corporations and encourages
corporations to restructure their earnings payouts to maximize total income (i.e. lessen
the tax burden). Id. *
175. See Hugh J. Ault, International Issues in Corporate Tax Integration, 10 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 461 (1978) (stating that the interaction of domestic and international tax regimes create tax differentials which may cause the foreign investment to
be taxed at a higher tax level than a domestic investment due in part to inapplicability of shareholder credits to foreign investments). See also Corporate Tax Reform,
supra note 124, at 604-05 (noting that income from foreign investments can be taxed
more than domestic investments due to unavailability of foreign tax credits or exemptions to shareholders).
176. See Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 124, at 605-06 (stating that several
operational problems exist with international taxation). The current international tax
system is very complex (as evidenced by the United States provisions designed to
limit foreign tax credit), very formalistic (due in part to its scheduler nature), very
inaccurate (due to the overabundance of bilateral tax treaties leading to tax forum
shopping), quite unenforceable (due to the sophistication of modem capital markets),
and generally referred to as unworkable and unrealistic. Id.
177. See generally Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 124, at 607-13 (discussing
the two types of tax reform for the current United States system); Smith, supra note
121, at 127-29 (recommending non-discrimination and mutual agreement as solutions
to the double taxation dilemma); Paul D. Tutun, Arbitration Procedures in the United
States-German Income Tax Treaty: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in International Tax Disputes, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 179, 193 (1994) (recommending arbitration as
a dispute resolution technique).
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taxation and, at the same time, maintain the three principles stated

above. 7 The alternatives for reform usually fall within two categories:
proposals which fall within the concept of separate taxation for corporations and shareholders, and proposals which do not. 7 9 Legislators and

professionals
alike have proffered recommendations to cure the current
80

system.
The latter view of tax reform includes proposals to eliminate income
taxation and replace it with a cash flow taxation, thereby limiting taxation solely to residence countries through both elimination of dual jurisdiction and separation of taxation of corporations and shareholders.
These proposals focus more on an international overhaul of taxation
rather than a domestic refinement, because the proposal focuses on substance rather than procedure. 8'

Recommendations involving the former category focus on using the
existing statutory structure to improve the tax system, which would

simplify and refine the current system." Proposals include either replacement or relaxation of the arm's length standard"a or revising the

tax system, with competitiveness as the major goal of United States.184
178. See supra note 177 (noting that it is preferable to revise tax laws through
non-discrimination and mutual agreement, as well as through arbitration).
179. Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 124, at 607.
180. See David R. Tillinghast, International Tax Simplification, 8 AM. J. TAX
PoL'Y 187, 188-89 (1990) [hereinafter Tax Simplification] (discussing the simplification
of the income tax system in terms of international transactions by means of "compromising policy aims" and "accepting degrees of relative inequity.")
181. This comment does not address these recommendations because, although
feasible in the distant future as national infrastructures and procedures become increasingly intertwined, the current state of tax legislation would not allow for such radical
change.
182. Tax Simplification, supra note 180, at 193-97 (suggesting the termination of
deferral or a rollback of Subpart F).
183. See United States Taxation, supra note 106, at 563-65 (recommending the
relaxation of the arm's length standard to strengthen the international competitiveness
of United States exports since arm's length pricing appears impossible to achieve).
184. See Daniel P. Shepherdson, The Simplification of Subpart F, 17 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 459, 465-66 (1985) (discussing that the Subpart F deferral mechanism operates to favor investments in foreign operations over domestic operations);
Joel Slemrod, Effect of Taxation with International Capital Mobility, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBIEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMTION TAX,

115-16 (Henry J. Aar-

on et al. eds., 1988) (discussing the burdens and economic effects of capital income
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Nevertheless, the concept of national tax harmonization remains one of
the more plausible approaches
to double taxation, separating corporate
85
and shareholder taxation.1
This approach contains the notion that all nations should maintain
"substantially similar national tax systems.' 1 6 It would address twothirds of the principles and problems discussed throughout this comment.
This approach addresses harmonization, which would, in the sense of
equivalent national tax systems, maintain capital import and export neutrality while maintaining efficiency within a tax jurisdiction. Additionally, because of the similarity and equivalency of the tax systems, reciprocity issues may become irrelevant.' Because nations would maintain similar tax systems, problems concerning tax differentials and operational differences also would become irrelevant.
Harmonization as an approach to double taxation, however, still does
not address the principle of nondiscrimination and the problem of incorrect premises. Harmonized national tax systems still will not address
discriminatory issues one nation applies to foreigners because it is unlikely that "one nation's government will yield national control over tax
policies in the interest of harmonization."' 8 In addition, nations may
view issues such as national competitiveness differently. 9 As such,
internal premises may end up forcing legislators to take domestic views
of tax policy, thus forsaking international goals.
In summary, of all the proposals listed above, harmonization as a goal
for the reduction of double taxation would most clearly incorporate the
principles an international tax system should retain, while simultaneously
reducing problems associated with international tax systems. Thus, harmonization stands out as the most workable theory in today's legislative
climate.

taxation).
185. Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 124, at 609.
186. Id. See Brian J. Arnold & Neil H. Harris, NAFTA, and the Taxation of Corporate Investment: A View from Within NAFTA, 49 TAX L. REy. 529, 577-79 (1994)

(recommending that countries should harmonize tax treaty provisions for direct crossborder investments).
187. Since countries tax and calculate income in the source and residence country
at similar rates, similarly, the need for bilateral tax treaties which reduce taxes in one
country for sake of another may not be applicable once nations harmonize their tax
systems.
188. Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 124, at 609.
189. Id.
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B. OBJECTIVENESS, EVEN VITH SUBJECTIVENESS
Some may consider the Code subjective, as it applies to the taxation
of multinationals with respect to § 482 and Subpart F.19 A portion of

the subjective character of the Code lies in the difficulty of determining
an applicable foreign law. 9 Another element that adds subjectiveness
to the Code is the existence of multiple tests for allocating the arm's
length standard price."

forms,

from

misallocations.'

Tax

The subjectiveness manifests itself in many

Court

decisions 93

to

the

Commissioners

4

As stated earlier, courts have rejected the Commissioner's determina-

tions in many cases, due in part to the Tax Courts' overly strict judicial
review and its application of incorrect standards of judicial review.'9

Legislation envisions that the Commissioner retain a large amount of
discretion to determine comparable transactions, in lieu of an appropriate

comparable transaction." 6 The discretion on the part of the Commis-

190. See Abuse of Discretion Standard, supra note 6, at 510 (discussing the way
the Code, through the courts, can "inject vulnerability" into transfer pricing allocations; Aramco Advantage Cases, supra note 159, at 205-06 (illustrating the subjectiveness of the IRS in pricing intracompany transactions).
191. Aramco Advantage Cases, supra note 159, at 206 (noting that the Tax Court
and the IRS both agreed that foreign law legitimately influenced the reasoning of the

Court).
192. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (providing at least six different methods of
allocating an ann's length price to related parties). See also Transfer Pricing of Intangibles, supra note 161, at 39 (noting that the White Paper recommended retaining the
comparable uncontrolled price method and also suggested using the basic arm's length
rate of return method (BALR method) and the profit split basic rate of return method
(BALR Plus method) if comparables were not available).
193. See generally Abuse of Discretion Standard, supra note 6. at 432 (discussing
cases tried before the Tax Court).
194. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Commissioner, 961 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1992)
(disallowing the Commissioner's allocation of income from a United States parent to
a Spanish subsidiary); Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394 (1972) (holding
that § 482 does not apply to income distortions not caused by the controlling party,
but rather by governing law).
195. See Abuse of Discretion Standard, supra note 6, at 433-34 (discussing that
the Tax Court has effectively substituted its own judgment for that of the Commissioner and that subjectiveness in the application of the Code has resulted).
196. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a)(2). See Gold v. United States. 552 F. Supp. 66, 70
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sioner has, in itself, the makings of subjective standards.", Recent
Treasury Department regulations attempted to introduce a degree of flexibility and comparability among allocations, thereby lessening the subjec-

tiveness of the Commissioner.'98
Practitioners proffer recommendations involving the application of the
"abuse of discretion" standard to § 482 and Subpart F inquiries as a
panacea to the arbitrary nature of the Commissioners allocations. 99
While arguably effective in curing the misallocation, the subjective nature of the two sections of the Code remain intact.' A more objective standard, while still not effective in curing the subjective nature of
the Code, is the "reasonable mind of the Commissioner" standard.2"'
The Rose decision demonstrates one solution to the subjective character of the two sections of the Code.2" As discussed above, the Court

(D. Colo. 1982) (holding that § 482 gives the Commissioner the power to reallocate
expenses and income among related parties); Atlas Tool Co., Inc., v. Commissioner,
614 F.2d 860, 868 (3d Cir. 1980) (allowing the Commissioner's discretion in disallowing an attempt to categorize income earned as capital gains, rather than ordinary
income); Echols v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 703, 707-08 (5th Cir. 1991) (indicating
that the "worthlessness" of interests between related parties is one of not only objective, but subjective indicia for the Commissioner).
197. Stanley S. Surrey, Treasury's Need to Curb Tax Avoidance in Foreign Business Through the Use of 482, 28 J. TAX'N 75, 76 (1968). Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury Surrey stated.
A typical suggestion is that the Regulations should supply a "mechanical safe
haven" in the area of the pricing of goods . . . . The reason is that no satisfactory device has yet been suggested or worked out. The variation in profit
from industry to industry, among companies within an industry and even among
product lines within a company is much too great to permit a single percentage, or a series of percentages . . . in establishing transfer prices . . . . The
safe haven will have to lie in a sensible, reasonable administration of the Regulations themselves.
198. Abuse of Discretion Standard, supra note 6, at 452. See supra notes 37 and
38 and accompanying text (suggesting that The 1992 Proposed Regulations and The
1993 Temporary Regulations are viewed as more flexible than prior regulations in that
they eliminate the prioritization of methods for evaluating an arm's length transaction).
Additionally, the new regulations contain language indicating a comparability aspect to
the regulations. Id.
199. Abuse of Discretion Standard, supra note 6, at 504.
200. Id. at 504-505.
201. Id. at 513.
202. See Rose v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 397, 408 (1987) (holding that when the
taxpayer entered into the transaction solely for tax reasons, rather than if a taxpayer
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in Rose defined a new four-prong objective test, using subjective factors
to determine whether it believed the test to be applicable to a particular
transaction? 3 The attractiveness of this approach is that it does not
require the legislature to rewrite the two sections of the Code in order

to eliminate their subjective character. The Court simply can use the
subjective factors as a screening process, thereby allowing fewer
transactions to escape the grasp of the Code that allows multinationals
to avoid paying taxes on income earned. Although the existence of
multiple tests allows the Commissioner to "best allocate" a transaction
price depending on the situation, a unified test will surely help to eliminate the subjectiveness of the two sections?'

Additionally, Congress

has proposed codification of such a solution in the Code.2
The enactment of specific objective tests for determining arm's length
transaction prices and deferrals of income which controlled foreign cor-

porations generate, even if containing subjective subtests, will provide
much needed clarity to the application of § 482 and Subpart F of the
Code.
V. CONCLUSION

§ 482 and Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code provide the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department with strong weapons

mistakenly believes there existed a potential for profit, the court may use both subjective and objective analysis to determine the proper allocation of § 482 and Subpart

F).
203. See id at 409-22 (describing in detail the objective four-prong test). See also
Generic Tax Shelters, supra note 145, at 282-84 (discussing that the Court in Rose
combined objective and subjective tests to develop a "unified approach" in evaluating
generic tax shelters).
204. Applying a unified objective test rather than a subjective test should have the
effect of providing a clear direction to the IRS and multinationals as to the standard
to administer in Subpart F and § 482 cases.
205. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662(e)(3)(D), 58 Fed. Reg. 5304 (1993) (demonstrating that Congress changed the definition of the reasonable cause and good faith
exception from a subjective standard to an objective standard). See also Raymond
Turner, Foreign Taxation Highlights of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 21 INT'L LAW.
487, 515 (1987) (indicating that the Act replaced the subjective test used by a shareholder to establish whether the controlled foreign corporation was used to avoid taxes
with an objective test designed to flag potential abusers).
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in the fight against the abuse of foreign-domiciled entities for the purpose of avoiding or evading income taxation in the United States. These
two sections of the Code have deep-rooted legislative history behind
them and Congress has revised or amended them on several occasions.
Through these two sections, the IRS may duly tax billions of dollars.
Without the sections, those dollars could elude the taxing authorities
domestically.
Unfortunately, the existence of these two sections has, on occasion,
caused double taxation on income from legitimate operations. It has also
provided unclear, subjective standards which the taxing authorities fail to
apply appropriately at the cost of the taxpayer.
National tax harmonization, whereby similar tax systems apply similar
treatment to taxpayers, remains one of the more plausible recommendations for curing the double taxation problem domestically. Developing
objective standards, even if they incorporate subjective subtests, should
lead to a more consistent application of the Code. These two recommendations should help the taxing authorities implement the complex Tax
Code in such a way as to make it more consistent for the taxpayer.

